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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellees Ed and Debbie Holmes brought an action 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. SS 1400 et seq ., to recover attorney's 
fees and costs. These fees and costs were incurred by the 
Holmeses in challenging the re-evaluation of their daughter, 
Rebecca Holmes, which was to be done by the Millcreek 
Township School ("School District"), and in protesting the 
qualifications of a sign language interpreter whom the 
School District had assigned to work with their daughter. 
In addition, the Holmeses sued for reimbursement by the 
School District of the costs of the 1994 Independent 
Educational Evaluation ("IEE"), which the Holmeses had 
had performed on Rebecca. After a bench trial, the District 
Court held that the Holmeses were entitled to attorney's 
fees and certain costs associated with the 1994 IEE and 
with the Holmeses' challenge to the interpreter's 
qualifications. 
 
The School District appealed the award of fees and costs 
to the Holmeses. We will reverse the District Court's 
conclusion that the Holmeses were entitled to 
reimbursement for the 1994 IEE, but we will affirm their 
entitlement to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
Because we find the amount of the award excessive, 
however, we will reduce it. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
Rebecca H. Holmes is severely deaf. In the fall of 1992, as 
she entered the 5th grade, Rebecca transferred to the 
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Millcreek School District and was assigned to the School 
District's Belle Valley Elementary School. 
 
Because of Rebecca's disability, School District officials 
made arrangements for her to undergo a comprehensive 
psycho-educational evaluation. The purpose of the 
evaluation was to assist the School District in creating a 
suitable Individualized Educational Plan ("IEP") for Rebecca, 
as required by IDEA.2 Personnel at the Center for Deafness 
at the Western Pennsylvania School for the Deaf (the 
"WPSD") performed an IEE, which was paid for by the 
School District. The IEE was the basis for Rebecca's IEP for 
the 1992-93 school year. 
 
Rebecca's 1992-93 IEP included hearing impaired 
support, speech theory, and language therapy. In addition, 
Rebecca used a hearing aid and part-time interpreter 
services in the classroom. The interpreter, Kevin Feyas, was 
employed by the School District. In addition, on September 
1, 1992, Chris DiFilippo was hired by the School District as 
an interpreter for deaf students at Belle Valley. DiFilippo 
also worked with Rebecca during the 1992-93 school year. 
 
Rebecca continued with the same IEP during the 1993-94 
school year. During 1994, however, the School District 
would be obligated to do a multi-disciplinary re-evaluation 
of Rebecca. The re-evaluation would determine Rebecca's 
continued eligibility for special education services and 
recommend a plan for the 1994-95 school year. The 
Holmeses did not agree with the method of re-evaluation 
proposed by the School District because a sign language 
interpreter would be used. The Holmeses believed that 
Rebecca should be assessed only by people who could 
communicate directly with her by sign language while she 
was being tested. 
 
On December 6, 1993, mid-way through Rebecca's 6th 
grade year, Mrs. Holmes asked the School District to have 
the WPSD conduct an IEE of Rebecca as part of the re- 
evaluation. Mrs. Holmes asked the School District to pay 
for this second IEE. The School District refused to pay for 
additional assessments by the WPSD but proposed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Part III.A. infra. 
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perform its own re-evaluation. The School District informed 
the Holmeses that the School District could perform an 
appropriate re-evaluation with its own experts, who were 
familiar with Rebecca, her academic progress, and the 
School District's curriculum. 
 
After the School District refused their request to have the 
WPSD evaluate their daughter, the Holmeses made 
arrangements themselves for a WPSD evaluation of Rebecca 
on February 10, 1994. The resulting IEE consisted of two 
reports. The first, a two-page re-evaluation of Rebecca's 
sign language skills, was authored by Marlene Schecter- 
Connors. The second, a ten-page "Interview Summary," was 
prepared by a psychologist, Dr. Paul Loera. Dr. Loera met 
with Rebecca and her parents and reviewed various 
materials produced in 1992 by the WPSD in connection 
with its first evaluation of Rebecca. 
 
On March 4, 1994, the School District filed a request for 
a due process hearing on the appropriateness of its 
proposed re-evaluation of Rebecca. Prior to the hearing, the 
parties engaged in mediation but were unable to reach an 
agreement. The Holmeses then obtained a continuance of 
the hearing because they were involved in another due 
process proceeding concerning the education of their son, 
Matthew, who is also hearing-impaired. 
 
On April 4, during the period of the continuance, the 
School District asked the Holmeses for permission to re- 
evaluate Rebecca. Mrs. Holmes requested that the School 
District not perform any testing, evaluating, or other 
procedures that would result in a written report that could 
be incorporated into Rebecca's multi-disciplinary team 
("MDT") report. Mrs. Holmes also informed the School 
District that she would require that WPSD-approved 
personnel be members of the MDT and that she had not yet 
received the reports of 1994 assessment which the 
Holmeses had had done by the WPSD. In addition, Mrs. 
Holmes advised the School District that she opposed the 
use of an interpreter in the re-evaluation. 
 
During April, May, and June, Dr. Richard Lansberry, a 
school psychologist, compiled Rebecca's Comprehensive 
Evaluation Report ("CER") for the MDT. The data in the 
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CER included the WPSD 1992 IEE of Rebecca, evaluations 
from Rebecca's speech therapist, and a language evaluation 
of Rebecca by Kevin Feyas. Dr. Lansberry also informally 
interviewed Rebecca, with Kevin Feyas serving as 
interpreter. 
 
On April 28, Mrs. Holmes again requested a detailed 
description of any testing of Rebecca by the School District. 
She also reminded the School District that she would not 
consent to any testing to re-evaluate Rebecca. A copy of the 
draft CER was sent to the Holmeses on July 7, 1994, nine 
days after the WPSD's 1994 IEE reports was transmitted to 
the School District. 
 
At the start of the 1994-95 school year, two MDT 
meetings were held, with the Holmeses present, to develop 
an IEP for Rebecca. The resulting four-page CER stated 
that Rebecca "will have access to a sign language 
interpreter throughout all of her school day" and access to 
structured study guides. In response to the CER, the 
Holmeses wrote a dissenting opinion in which they stated 
that they were dissatisfied with Dr. Lansberry's report. They 
contended that the CER contained errors of fact, excluded 
important information, and did not include information 
about their goal of exposing Rebecca to "the deaf 
community." 
 
The new plan, based on the CER, was implemented on 
September 14, 1994, and was valid through June 7, 1995. 
Despite their dissent to the CER, the Holmeses did not 
object to the implementation of this plan. 
 
In January 1995, the Holmeses requested due process 
consideration of their request for reimbursement for the 
1994 IEE performed by the WSPD. The bill for the 1994 IEE 
was $400. The Holmeses presented this bill to the School 
District on May 16, 1995. In January 1995, the Holmeses 
had also raised concerns with the School District about the 
qualifications of Rebecca's interpreter, Chris DiFilippo. 
DiFilippo had become Rebecca's full-time interpreter in 
December 1994 after her prior interpreter, Tina Hammer, 
left. DiFilippo began working with Rebecca on a daily basis 
on January 3, 1995. On January 23, after Rebecca 
complained about DiFilippo, the Holmeses requested a due 
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process hearing regarding his qualifications. Prior to the 
hearing, the School District provided the Holmeses with 
evaluations to demonstrate that DiFilippo was qualified. 
The Department of Education had advised the School 
District to contact Beverly Hollrah of Washington, D.C., to 
conduct an evaluation of DiFilippo's skills. Hollrah viewed 
a tape of DiFilippo interpreting for Rebecca in several 
classes. On February 16, 1995, Hollrah informed the 
School District that DiFilippo had done "a very nice and 
satisfactory job of communicating the material presented in 
all classes videotaped." When later deposed, however, 
Hollrah stated that she did not know whether DiFilippo was 
qualified, that she had been unaware that a student had 
challenged his interpreting skills when she reviewed the 
tape, and that, had she been aware of the student's 
complaint, she would have wanted to meet with the student 
and get further information before rendering an assessment 
of DiFilippo's skills. 
 
The due process hearing began on February 21, 1995. 
The Holmeses had also requested leave to obtain an 
independent evaluation of DiFilippo's skills. In addition, 
they had asked to present evidence regarding the IEE 
reimbursement issue. Although the School District had not 
yet received a bill for the IEE, the Holmeses' counsel 
advised the School District of the approximate cost of the 
IEE. 
 
At the February 21 hearing, the Holmeses received 
Hollrah's report. At the same time, the Hearing Officer 
announced that Marilyn Mitchell of the National Technical 
Institute for the Deaf would evaluate DiFilippo's skills on 
behalf of the Holmeses. The Holmeses had chosen Mitchell 
to evaluate DiFilippo without input from the School 
District, and the Holmeses paid for Mitchell's services. On 
March 21, Mitchell reported that in her opinion DiFilippo 
was not an adequate interpreter for Rebecca. 
 
On March 8, however, prior to Mitchell's report and 
before anyone was familiar with its contents, DiFilippo 
requested to be relieved of the interpreter position and to be 
transferred to the position of "special education assistant." 
The request was made in part because DiFilippo did not 
want to undergo the stress and potential harassment of a 
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hearing on his qualifications.3 On March 9, the School 
District notified the Holmeses that DiFilippo had applied for 
the new position, and, on March 20, the School District 
approved DiFilippo's transfer to the position of special 
education assistant. 
 
Despite DiFilippo's transfer to a new job, when the due 
process hearing was reconvened on March 21, the Hearing 
Officer concluded that the issue of DiFilippo's qualifications 
was not moot. The hearing officer came to this conclusion 
because he found that a decision on DiFilippo's 
qualifications would be helpful in resolving Rebecca's claim 
for compensatory education during the period in which 
DiFilippo had served as her interpreter. 
 
On April 6, the School District offered tutoring to 
Rebecca. The tutoring was to consist of one hour for each 
of the forty seven days that DiFilippo had worked with 
Rebecca, although the School District informed the 
Holmeses that it "[did] not agree with the parents' 
characterization that Mr. DiFilippo . . . [was] not qualified." 
The Holmeses rejected the offer, apparently because of 
Rebecca's schedule of extracurricular activities. The School 
District then asked what, other than the tutoring, could be 
provided to help Rebecca in her studies. The Holmeses 
requested study guides for math, a subject in which the 
School District had determined that Rebecca was weak, 
regardless of her disability. 
 
On June 1, 1995, after nine days of proceedings, the 
Hearing Officer decided that the parents were entitled to 
reimbursement for the 1994 IEE. Specifically, the Hearing 
Officer concluded that "it is clear that the private 
evaluations secured by the parents provided meaningful 
information which helped to determine the nature and 
extent of Rebecca's disability along with necessary 
programming." The Hearing Officer did not, however, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. DiFilippo already was familiar with such hearings because his brother 
Dean had served as an interpreter for Rebecca's brother. Dean DiFilippo 
had undergone a due process hearing, initiated by the Holmeses, over 
his qualifications. Chris DiFilippo had attended the hearing, witnessed 
the way in which the process had unfolded, and seen that the Holmeses 
had prevailed against his brother. 
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determine whether it was appropriate to perform an 
evaluation of Rebecca with the assistance of a sign 
language interpreter. The Hearing Officer concluded that it 
was "beyond the scope of this hearing to determine if 
Rebecca must be assessed only by people who can directly 
sign with her as she is being tested for an appropriate 
evaluation." 
 
The School District appealed. On July 28, 1995, the 
Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel 
unanimously reversed the Hearing Officer's determination. 
The Panel concluded that the School District did not have 
to reimburse the Holmeses for the 1994 IEE because the 
Hearing Officer had committed legal error when he did not 
consider whether the School District could provide an 
"appropriate" re-evaluation. Instead, the Hearing Officer 
had focused on whether the School District had used 
information derived from the evaluation done by the 
Holmeses' experts.4 Quoting the opinion in Kozak v. 
Hampton Township Sch. Dist., 655 A.2d 641, 647 (Pa. 
Commw. 1995), the Panel stated "[a]ccording to the plain 
language of [Pennsylvania regulations], parents are entitled 
to reimbursement for a private evaluation only if . . . the 
private evaluation shows the school district's MDE to be 
inappropriate." The Panel further noted that the Holmeses' 
requirement, that the evaluator be fluent in sign language 
and that an interpreter not be employed, had not been 
adopted by either Pennsylvania or federal statutes or 
regulations. For that reason, the Holmeses were not 
justified in demanding reimbursement for their IEE on the 
basis that the re-evaluation proposed by the School District 
was inappropriate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Both the Hearing Officer and the Review Panel concluded that the 
issue of whether DiFilippo was qualified had been settled; thus, neither 
one determined whether the interpreter was qualified. See app. at 1318 
("When Rebecca's hearing began a second issue regarding qualifications 
of her interpreter was introduced. . . The parties eventually reached an 
agreement on the issue of the interpreter and the sole remaining issue 
was concerned with the request for reimbursement for the independent 
evaluations."); App. at 1332, n. 21 ("Early in the course of the 
protracted 
proceedings, the added issue of the qualifications of Rebecca's 
interpreter, and the corollary questions of compensatory education 
services and substitute interpreter qualifications, were resolved."). 
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Subsequently, the Holmeses sought payment of 
attorney's fees, incurred up to that time, in the amount of 
$53,445.74. The School District denied the Holmeses' claim 
on the ground that the parents had not been a prevailing 
party in the due process hearings. 
 
On August 14, 1995, the Holmeses filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. They requested attorney's fees and costs as 
the prevailing party within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415. The Holmeses claimed to be the prevailing party 
because 1) they were successful in demanding 
reimbursement for the IEE and 2) as a result of the due 
process hearings, the School District had reassigned 
DiFilippo, had assigned another interpreter to Rebecca, had 
offered compensatory education for the period that 
DiFilippo had been assigned, and had agreed not to use 
Chris or Dean DiFilippo as substitute interpreters. 
 
After a 3-day trial, the District Court announced its 
opinion from the bench. The court found that the Holmeses 
were the prevailing party. It reversed the Appeals Review 
Panel's denial of reimbursement for the cost of the 1994 
IEE because portions of the IEE had been used by the 
School District to formulate Rebecca's CER. The court did 
not analyze whether the School District could itself have 
conducted, or did conduct, an appropriate re-evaluation. 
On August 27, 1998, the District Court issued an order 
awarding attorney's fees of $141,070.28 to the Holmeses. 
 
The School District appealed the award of attorney's fees 
and costs, as well as the award of costs associated with the 
1994 IEE. We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The District Court's findings of facts are reviewed for 
clear error. Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. 2300 Group, 
Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). We have plenary 
review over the District Court's choice, interpretation and 
application of the law to the facts. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F. 3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1994). Generally, we review a fee award for abuse of 
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discretion. Kean v. Stone, 966 F.2d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Where, however, the question is whether the District Court 
applied the correct legal standard, our review is plenary. Id. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Statutory Framework 
 
IDEA establishes minimum requirements for the 
education of children with disabilities.5  The statute requires 
states to provide such children with a "free[and] 
appropriate public education," which is based on the 
unique needs of each individual student.6  20 U.S.C. S 1412. 
School districts achieve this goal by developing a detailed 
instructional plan, or an IEP, for each child who is 
classified as disabled. 20 U.S.C. S 1401(a)(18). An IEP 
consists of a specific statement of a student's present 
abilities, goals for improvement of the student's abilities, 
services designed to meet those goals, and a timetable for 
reaching the goals by way of the services. Id . at 
S 1401(a)(20). The Congressional purpose in enacting IDEA 
was to provide "access to a `free appropriate public 
education' . . which . . . is . . sufficient to confer some 
educational benefit upon the handicapped child." Board of 
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982). In this way, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. IDEA was enacted "to assure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their 
unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of children with disabilities 
and their parents or guardians are protected." 20 U.S.C. sec. 1400(c). 
 
6. A "free appropriate public education" is defined in 20 U.S.C. sec. 
401(a)(18) as special education and related services that-- 
 
       (A) have been provided at public expense, under pu blic supervision 
       and direction, and without charge, 
 
       (B) meet the standards of the State educational ag ency, 
 
       (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
       school education in the State involved, and 
 
       (D) are provided in conformity with the individual ized education 
       program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title. 
 
See also 22 Pa. Code S 14.1 ("appropriate program"). 
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the IEP provides a "basic floor of opportunity" but not 
necessarily "the optimal level of services . . .." Carlisle Area 
School v. Scott P. By and Through Bess P., 62 F.3d 520, 
533-34 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
States that receive IDEA funding must create an 
administrative structure to develop IEPs. 20 U.S.C. 
S 1414(a)(5). In addition, states must establish procedural 
safeguards for children with disabilities and for their 
parents; among the most important of these safeguards is 
allowing parents to dispute the appropriateness of their 
child's IEP through an impartial due process hearing. 20 
U.S.C. S 1415. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, an IEP is defined as "[A] written 
plan for the appropriate education of an exceptional 
student." 22 Pa. Code S 14.31(b).7 The Commonwealth 
requires an IEP to include: 1) a statement of the student's 
present levels of educational performance; 2) a statement of 
annual goals and short-term learning outcomes which are 
responsive to the learning needs identified in an evaluation 
report; and 3) a statement of the specific special education 
services and programs and related services to be provided 
to the disabled student. 22 Pa. Code S 14.32(f). Parents may 
request due process hearings about the appropriateness of 
the IEP pursuant to 22 Pa. Code S 14.64(a). 8 
 
B. Reimbursement for the IEE 
 
Pennsylvania regulations allow parents to be reimbursed 
for a private evaluation of a disabled student if that 
evaluation was sought as a result of the parent's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Pennsylvania defines the term "exceptional children" as "children of 
school age who deviate from the average in physical, mental, emotional 
or social characteristics to such an extent that they require special 
educational facilities or services . . . ." Pa. Stat. Ann. Title 24, S 13- 
1371(1). 
 
8. 22 Pa. Code S 14.64(a) provides: 
 
       "Parents may request an impartial due process hearing concerning 
       the identification, evaluation or educational placement of . . . a 
child 
       who is eligible or who is thought to be eligible, if the parents 
       disagree with the school district's identification, evaluation or 
       placement of . . . the student . . . ." 
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disagreement with the school's MDE, and if the evaluation 
then demonstrates that the school's MDE was in some way 
inappropriate. See Kozak, 655 A.2d at 647. 
 
The record here shows that the Holmeses sought the 
services of the WPSD only after informing the School 
District of their belief that it could not properly re-evaluate 
Rebecca. Thus, prior to obtaining an IEE, the Holmeses met 
their burden of stating their disagreement with the School 
District's process of evaluating their daughter. The crucial 
issue is, however, whether the Holmeses demonstrated that 
the School District's evaluation of their daughter was 
inappropriate. 
 
First, we note that the District Court did not directly 
address the issue. The court's only reference to whether the 
School District's evaluation was appropriate was oblique: 
"Rebecca got a full-time interpreter because of evaluation 
initiated by the parents, not the school district." Thus, 
rather than considering whether the School District's re- 
evaluation was appropriate, the court focused on the 
School District's purported reliance on the WPSD report in 
formulating Rebecca's educational plan. 
 
This was error. The School District is required by federal 
and state law to consider all evaluations of disabled 
students. See 34 C.F.R. S 503(c) (stating that if the parents 
obtain an IEE at private expense, the results "[m]ust be 
considered by the public agency"); see also  22 Pa. Code 
S 14.67(c)("if parents obtain an IEE at private expense, the 
results . . . shall be considered by the district in decisions 
made with respect to the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to the student."). For that reason, the fact 
that the School District considered the WSPD's second 
evaluation of Rebecca does necessarily indicate that 
reimbursement is required. 
 
The Holmeses may be reimbursed for the WPSD IEE only 
by showing that the School District's 1994 re-evaluation 
would be inappropriate. Bernardsville Board of Education v. 
J.H., 42 F.3d 149,157 (3d Cir. 1994). The Holmeses have 
not shown this. Although the Holmeses contend that the 
School District's evaluation was inappropriate because of 
the lack of expertise of the individuals who conducted it, 
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they base their position not on statutory or regulatory 
language but on expert opinions which do not have the 
force of law. 
 
The Holmeses argue that the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education's 1995 Guidelines on the "Education of Students 
with Hearing Loss" supports their position. The Holmeses 
are correct that these guidelines recommend the use of a 
psychologist fluent in sign language or in another form of 
communication preferred by the student, in evaluating 
hearing disabled students. ("The participation of the 
psychologist is necessary in any MDT. . .. It is critical that 
the psychologist be fluent in the communication mode and 
psychological/linguistic uniqueness of the student") (citing 
Pa. Dept. of Educ., Guidelines for the Education of Students 
with Hearing Loss (1995)). These guidelines do not, 
however, establish law. As the Appeals Review Panel noted, 
these Guidelines suggest an optimum level of educational 
services and were made for purposes of advocacy. They 
were not binding on the School District at any time relevant 
to this suit.9 See App. at 1336 ("Even if there is only one 
school of thought in the modern literature of deaf education 
regarding [whether a non-fluent psychologist can 
appropriately evaluate deaf students] . . . there is currently 
a difference between the professional optimum and the 
legal minimum.") (citations omitted). Thus, the Board 
concluded, "contrary to the parents assertion, neither 
Pennsylvania or federal statutes and regulations have 
adopted [the Holmeses'] position."10 
 
The Holmeses go on to assert that the school 
psychologist, Dr. Lansberry, was not fluent in American 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As a way of emphasizing this point, we note that the Guidelines were 
still in advance copy form at the end of the school year 1994-1995, and 
that although the Guidelines were distributed to schools in August of 
1995, it is not clear when they were in the possession of the relevant 
officials at the Millcreek School District. See app. at 1613. 
 
10. In addition, a circular from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education, dated March, 1992, recommended that when a student's 
disability involves hearing loss, the MDT should"include evaluators 
knowledgeable about deafness/hearing impairment." The department 
noted, however, that when such evaluators are not available, a "qualified 
interpreter must be utilized during evaluations and conferences." 
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Sign Language ("ASL") and, thus, could not evaluate 
Rebecca appropriately. They claim that Dr. Lansberry 
"admitted that he was not qualified to evaluate Rebecca's 
need for interpreting services." In addition, the Holmeses 
argue that Kevin Feyas, who served as Dr. Lansberry's 
interpreter, was not credentialed as either an interpreter or 
a psychologist and thus could not have contributed to an 
appropriate evaluation of Rebecca. 
 
It is not disputed that Dr. Lansberry is not fluent in ASL. 
We do not, however, accept the Holmeses' contention that 
Dr. Lansberry's lack of fluency in ASL signifies that the 
School District's MDE was inappropriate. First, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that we must not substitute our 
judgment about proper education methods for that of state 
educational authorities. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. We must 
give "due weight" to the underlying state administrative 
proceedings. Id. at 206. In the instant action, the Appeals 
Review Panel concluded that Dr. Lansberry and others were 
able to evaluate Rebecca appropriately. We give due 
deference to that finding. 
 
We also note that, although we must consider 
administrative fact findings, we have not interpreted Rowley 
as requiring us to accept such findings. See Carlisle Area 
School, 62 F.3d at 529. Here, however, we do notfind 
sufficient evidence in the record to persuade us that we 
should second-guess the findings of the Board and the 
opinion of the School District. We find no indication that 
Dr. Lansberry, with the aid of Kevin Feyas, rather than the 
hypothetical psychologist trained in ASL, could not 
appropriately evaluate Rebecca. Dr. Lansberry testified 
that, with the help of translators, he had dealt with deaf 
children in the past. Although he believed that the MDT 
should include persons familiar with a deaf child's needs 
and persons who could communicate directly with the deaf 
child, he did not agree that he had to be fluent in sign 
language in order to appropriately assess Rebecca for 
purposes of creating an IEP. We conclude that Dr. 
Lansberry provided valuable information concerning 
Rebecca's need for increased interpreter services by 
assessing, inter alia, Rebecca's feelings about being hearing 
impaired, her desire for interpreter services, her academic 
abilities, and her academic progress. 
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Moreover, the School District's determinations about 
Rebecca's educational needs for the 1994-95 school year 
were based on the work of the entire MDT, rather than on 
the expertise of any one member of the MDT, including Dr. 
Lansberry. While ASL-fluent psychologists may be 
preferred, the Holmeses' own experts acknowledged that, 
with the help of a translator, appropriate evaluations of 
deaf students can be achieved by professionals who are not 
fluent in ASL. In addition, we find persuasive the School 
District's argument that their staff in some ways was 
better-qualified than the WPSD's staff to evaluate Rebecca. 
For instance, the School District's staff were familiar with 
the curriculum at Belle Valley and with Rebecca and the 
progress she was making. 
 
Similarly, we find no support in the record for the 
Holmeses' argument that Kevin Feyas' participation in the 
MDE implies that it was inappropriate. Whereas the 
Holmeses suggest that Feyas was a novice in teaching the 
deaf at the time that he served as Dr. Lansberry's 
interpreter, the record shows that Mr. Feyas had worked 
with Rebecca for over two years and was aware of her 
preferred method of communication. Moreover, Feyas was 
familiar with the Belle Valley curriculum and had been 
certified by the state as a teacher for the hearing impaired. 
While Feyas was not certified by the Registry of Interpreters 
for the Deaf, a national registry, he had a provisional 
certification from another national organization, the Council 
of Education for the Deaf. These facts do not support the 
Holmeses' contention that Feyas was unqualified to assist 
in evaluating Rebecca.11 
 
In sum, we hold that there has been no showing that the 
School District's MDE was inappropriate. Thus, we 
conclude that the District Court erred in finding that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Moreover, we note, as did the Appeals Review Panel, that the 
Holmeses' denial of consent to the School District for testing or any 
other 
formal interaction with Rebecca for purposes of re-evaluation "effectively 
limited the School District's performance of its obligation to conduct an 
appropriate evaluation." As a result of this denial of consent, Dr. 
Lansberry was limited to reviewing, inter alia , previous evaluations of 
and data about Rebecca, and informal meetings with Rebecca and her 
interpreter, Mr. Feyas. 
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Holmeses were entitled to reimbursement for the IEE. As a 
matter of law, they were not. 
 
C. Attorney's Fees and Costs 
 
The District Court awarded attorney's fees and costs to 
the Holmeses because it found that they had prevailed in 
the due process hearing regarding the IEE and DiFilippo's 
qualifications. As to the latter, the Court found that the 
Holmeses had achieved three objectives: DiFilippo had been 
removed from his position as Rebecca's interpreter, another 
interpreter had been assigned, and Rebecca had received 
compensatory education for the period during which 
DiFilippo worked as her interpreter. The award of attorney's 
fees and costs was $141,070.28. 
 
The Education of the Handicapped Act's fee-shifting 
provision states that, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought 
under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may 
award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the 
parents or guardian of a child or youth with a disability 
who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(4)(B).12 
Thus, the language of the fee-shifting provision of the 
relevant statute is permissive, rather than mandatory. To 
qualify as a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the 
provision, a litigant must demonstrate that he obtained 
relief on a significant claim in the litigation, that such relief 
effected a material alteration in his legal relationship with 
the defendant and that the alteration is not merely 
technical or de minimis in nature. See Texas State Teachers 
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-93 
(1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). Further, 
the litigant must show that there is a "causal connection 
between the litigation and the relief from the defendant." 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 
F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Wheeler v. Towanda 
Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991). The 
pressure resulting from on-going litigation is sufficient to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The standards governing the award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988 are applicable to awards sought under the IDEA. See, e.g., 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7 (1983); Jodlowski v. Valley 
View Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 365-U, 109 F.3d 1250, 1253 n. 2 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
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satisfy this standard. Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. 
Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 545-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming 
viability of "catalyst theory," by which plaintiffs are eligible 
for fees without obtaining a judgment or formal settlement, 
as long as they prove that the suit accomplished its 
objective); see also D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 
F.3d 896, (3d Cir. 1997) (settlement agreement voluntarily 
and willingly entered into by school district and parents of 
handicapped child during IDEA mediation created binding 
contract between parties and was enforceable); cf. Farrar v. 
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (holding that plaintiff who 
wins nominal damages is prevailing party under section 
1988, but finding attorney's fee award inappropriate).13 
 
The District Court concluded that the Holmeses were a 
prevailing party pursuant to the "catalyst theory" affirmed 
by our circuit in Baumgartner. That is, the court concluded 
that "but for the [due process] hearings,[Chris DiFilippo] 
would have stayed at his original position." Because of the 
facts that the Holmeses initiated the hearing process, that 
DiFilippo resigned, and that a new interpreter was 
assigned, the court found that the Holmeses had achieved 
their desired relief. 
 
In support of its argument that the attorney's fee award 
was in error, the School District cites cases holding that 
plaintiffs may only be considered a prevailing party if the 
defendant's change of conduct is required by a lawsuit or a 
"lengthy enforceable settlement agreement." E.g. Patricia E. 
v. Board of Education of Community High School Dist. No. 
155, 894 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D.Ill. 1995). The School District 
argues that the facts of this case are at odds with this 
standard. The School District also asserts that the"but for" 
analysis employed by the District Court does not comport 
with Baumgartner. The School District contends that the 
catalyst theory requires "legal change" favorable to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Supreme Court recently in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693, 711-12 (2000), noted 
the circuit split on the viability of the "catalyst theory" post-Farrar 
but 
declined to address the issue in the context of that case as being 
premature. The Court indicated that any request for costs, including 
attorney's fees, must be addressed in the first instance by the District 
Court. 
 
                                17 
  
plaintiff " and that the "but for" analysis is not consistent 
with such affirmative change. Thus, the "but for analysis is 
not an adequate conception of cause" [for IDEA fee-shifting] 
. . . and the question of whether a party prevailed because 
of the legal proceeding rather than for some other reason is, 
at a minimum, a question about causality." See Board of 
Education of Downers Grade School Dist. No. 58 v. Steven 
L., 89 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown v. 
Griggsville Comm. Unit School Dist. No. 4, 12 F.3d 681, 684 
(7th Cir. 1993)). 
 
We agree that this is not a classic situation for 
application of the catalyst theory, B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of 
Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462 (D.N.J. 1998), because the record 
does not show definitively that the School District replaced 
DiFilippo in order to appease the Holmeses. Rather, the 
record shows that DiFilippo left the job of his own accord. 
Moreover, the record shows that, even when notifying the 
Holmeses that it would provide tutoring for Rebecca for the 
period that DiFilippo had served as her interpreter, the 
School District maintained its disagreement with the 
Holmeses' opinion about his qualifications. 
 
Nevertheless, the record also demonstrates that the 
Holmeses' objective of no longer having DiFilippo serve as 
an interpreter for Rebecca was achieved as a direct result 
of the due process hearing that they initiated. It was 
because of the potential for stress and embarrassment that 
DiFilippo left the interpreter's job. Although DiFilippo's 
decision to leave the position as interpreter and take 
another (significantly lower-paying) job say seem to have 
been a personal one, it was causally influenced by the 
Holmeses' initiation of the hearing. This sequence of events 
satisfies the Baumgartner standard. See 21 F.3d at 547-48. 
That the School District offered tutoring to Rebecca for the 
period during which DiFilippo was her interpreter 
buttresses the inference that the Holmeses' challenge to 
DiFilippo's qualifications resulted in the requisite "legal 
change" needed to demonstrate success for purposes of an 
award of attorney's fees and costs. 
 
This case is distinguishable from Wheeler v. Towanda 
Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1991), a case upon 
which the School District relies in challenging the 
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attorney's fee award. In Wheeler, the parents of a disabled 
student challenged the qualifications of the interpreter 
assigned to work with their child. We affirmed the denial of 
an attorney's fee award to the parents who made that 
challenge. Id. at 132. We did so, however, because we 
concluded that the parents had not shown a causal 
connection under either of their theories between their 
lawsuit and the hiring of a new interpreter. Id.  We noted 
that the school district had begun searching for a new 
interpreter months before the resolution of the 
administrative action initiated by the Wheelers, based, in 
part, on the fact that the interpreter had fallen ill. 
 
By contrast, our affirmance of the District Court's finding 
in this case is based on the fact that DiFilippo's departure 
from the position as Rebecca's interpreter was motivated by 
the Holmeses' actions, in particular, the stress and 
harassment that DiFilippo believed he might suffer as a 
result of the due process hearing. Having achieved their 
objective of having DiFilippo removed as Rebecca's 
interpreter, the Holmeses are entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n , 489 U.S. at 
791-93. 
 
Nevertheless, we find that the amount of the award was 
excessive. First, the Holmeses are no longer the prevailing 
party on the issue of reimbursement for the 1994 IEE. In 
addition, we note that both the Hearing Officer and Appeals 
Review Panel felt that the Holmeses and their counsel had 
"contributed to" the needlessly "protracted proceedings." We 
also note that the Holmeses bear the burden of establishing 
the reasonableness of the requested fees and are required 
to submit evidence to support their claims for hours 
expended in performing specified tasks. See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037. 
 
The accepted procedure for determining a reasonable fee 
award is to multiply reasonable hours expended on a 
matter by a reasonable billing rate for the attorneys who 
performed the tasks involved. Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035. 
A reasonable hourly rate is calculated according to the 
prevailing market in the community. Id. An attorney's 
showing of reasonableness must rest on evidence other 
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than the attorney's own affidavits. Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11 (1984). Moreover, the court must be 
careful to exclude from counsel's fee request "hours that 
are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. .. ." 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
 
Relying upon the cases that we have cited, supra , the 
School District argues that neither the requested hourly 
rate of the Holmeses' counsel, nor the hours expended in 
performing tasks for this litigation, is reasonable. The 
School District argues that counsel for the appellees failed 
to produce sufficient evidence that her rate request is 
commensurate with her skill, experience, and reputation in 
the community. She offers only her own affidavit in support 
of her rate and bases the rate on the prevailing hourly rate 
in Philadelphia or statewide. The School District is correct 
in contending that counsel's own affidavit may not be 
sufficient support for her hourly rate. Blum , 465 U.S. at 
895-96 n. 11. 
 
The School District also argues that the fee award 
contains repetitive and unnecessary billing by counsel for 
the appellees. The School District lists twenty-nine such 
instances of excessive billing, including: 111.5 hours for 
preparing an answer and brief in opposition to the School 
District's Exceptions to the Hearing Officer's decision; forty- 
six hours for preparing the complaint in this action; two 
and a half hours for preparing a self-executing disclosure; 
eighty-seven hours for the taking of and preparing for 
depositions regarding DiFilippo's qualifications; ten and 
one-half hours for preparing a pre-trial narrative statement; 
ninety-five and three-fourths hours for preparing, inter alia, 
motions in limine, motions for sanctions, and responses 
regarding DiFilippo's qualifications; twenty-five hours for 
taking the deposition of Marilyn Mitchell regarding 
DiFilippo's qualifications; and thirty-seven and a half hours 
for drafting a response to allegedly inaccurate and 
inadmissable statements in the School District's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
Counsel for the appellee contends that the award is not 
excessive, based on the degree of success she achieved in 
this litigation, the four-plus years spent in litigation over 
the issues involved in this action, the "risk of nonpayment" 
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assumed "when she undertakes to represent parents of deaf 
and hard of hearing students," and her status as a sole 
practitioner whose adversaries in disability rights cases 
invariably are "prestigious law firms." Counsel cites no law 
in support of her billing practices, other than Bernardsville, 
Brd. of Educ. v. J.H., 817 F. Supp. 14, 23 (D.N.J. 1993), 
aff 'd in part, 42 F.3d 160, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1994) for the 
proposition that "degree of success" is a factor to be 
considered in assessing fee requests, and Public Interest 
Group v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179 (3d Cir. 1995) for the 
proposition that the relevant legal community, for purposes 
of determining an hourly rate, is not confined necessarily to 
the borders of a town. 
 
Although the District Court has wide discretion in 
determining a fee award, we conclude that the fee awarded 
here was excessive. Our decision is predicated,first, on the 
fact that the Holmeses did not prevail on the 
reimbursement issue. Next, we find that counsel failed to 
properly support the hourly rate at which she requests 
reimbursement. We also find the fee breakdown provided in 
her billing records out of line with what is reasonable for 
counsel of the level of experience in litigating disability 
rights cases that counsel claims; with experience, the 
amount of time spent performing routine tasks in an area 
of one's expertise should decrease. Most significantly, we 
question the necessity of the great amount of time claimed 
by counsel for, inter alia, exploring DiFilippo's 
qualifications; we disagree with counsel's apparent 
understanding of her degree of success, in light of the 
outcome on appeal; and finally we find that this litigation 
was needlessly protracted, extending far beyond what was 
reasonable, given the nature of the issues involved in this 
case, which are not novel. Moreover, we note that this is 
not a case in which the school district has been 
intransigent or willfully undermining a disabled student's 
education; rather, it is apparent from the record that the 
School District meant to comply with the letter and spirit of 
the IDEA. Thus, this case should have been resolved years 
ago. 
 
Based on our conclusion that the fees claimed here are 
not reasonable, we will reduce the award of attorney's fees 
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and costs to one-fourth of the original $53,445.74 fee 
demand made by the Holmeses. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court erred in requiring reimbursement to the Holmeses for 
the IEE. We will, however, affirm an award of attorney's fees 
and costs to the Holmeses, but, because we find that the 
award of fees excessive, we reduce it to $35,267.57, one- 
fourth of $141,070.28 awarded by the District Court. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I join in the majority's opinion except to the extent that 
it sustains any attorney's fee being paid to the Holmeses. 
Inasmuch as I depart from the majority's conclusion on the 
Chris DiFilippo matter, in my view the Holmeses were not 
prevailing parties under 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B), previously 
20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)(4)(B), in any respect. The majority 
indicates that this case "is not a classic situation for 
application of the catalyst theory because the record does 
not show definitively that the School District replaced 
DiFilippo in order to appease the Holmeses." Majority 
Opinion at 18 (citation omitted). I certainly agree with that 
statement as the record cannot even support an inferential 
conclusion that the School District replaced DiFilippo to 
appease the Holmeses or for any other purpose. To the 
contrary, DiFilippo left his interpreter position because, as 
the majority recognizes, he "did not want to undergo the 
stress and potential harassment of a hearing on his 
qualifications." Majority Opinion at 6-7. Thus, as the 
majority recites, "the record shows that DiFilippo left the 
job of his own accord." Majority Opinion at 18. Nothing 
could be clearer. 
 
Obviously DiFilippo had good reason to take such action 
for, as the majority points out, he was familiar with 
proceedings under the IDEA. Accordingly, he knew what to 
expect at the anticipated hearing. In the circumstances, 
who could blame him for seeking a new position in order to 
stay out of this litigation? 
 
In any event, even if DiFilippo should not have been 
intimidated by the Holmeses' challenge to his qualifications, 
the fee award still is unjustified. After all, at least to the 
best of my knowledge, we never have applied the"catalyst 
theory" to award a plaintiff fees against a defendant in 
circumstances in which a plaintiff, as here, does not obtain 
any relief by judgment or settlement from the defendant 
and the defendant has done nothing to change its behavior 
"to eliminate the complained-of conduct." See Baumgartner 
v. Harrisburg Housing Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 
1994). As we indicated in Institutionalized Juveniles v. 
Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 
1985) (emphasis added), dealing with a fee application 
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under 42 U.S.C. S 1988, "a court must decide whether 
plaintiffs are prevailing parties and whether there is a 
causal connection between the litigation and the relief 
obtained from the defendant." While there can be no doubt 
that DiFilippo took action which satisfied the Holmeses, he 
never has been a party to these proceedings in either their 
administrative or judicial aspects. Moreover, the Holmeses 
are not seeking any fees from him nor could they do so. 
Furthermore, the administrative hearing authorities' view 
that the matter of DiFilippo's qualifications was settled 
merely was a recognition that the issue was moot. 
Obviously, because the defendants neither unilaterally nor 
by agreement with the Holmeses removed DiFilippo as an 
interpreter, the parties to this litigation did not settle the 
case. 
 
Inasmuch as DiFilippo by his action mooted the 
controversy over his qualifications, no party could prevail 
on that issue and none has done so. Thus, we are not 
concerned here with the policy considerations we set forth 
in Baumgartner, i.e., if a defendant unilaterally could moot 
the underlying case by conceding to a plaintiff 's demands 
attorneys might be reluctant to bring civil rights suits. Id. 
at 548. In this regard I emphasize that there is no 
suggestion in the record that the defendants acted in 
collusion with DiFilippo to moot the issues involving him. 
Thus, the defendants did not urge DiFilippo to apply for the 
new position to which he was transferred. 
 
I want to point out that the majority's opinion is very 
significant as it cannot be limited to IDEA cases. The 
provision that a fee may be awarded to a "prevailing party' 
in 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i)(3)(B) is reflected in other statutes. For 
example there are "prevailing party" provisions in the civil 
rights, 42 U.S.C. S 1988, and employment discrimination, 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k), statutes. As a result of this case we 
may anticipate that in future litigation in which plaintiffs 
obtain relief by reason of the actions of persons not parties 
to litigation they will seek fees from the defendants. 
 
Finally I want to point out that the Supreme Court 
recently in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693, 711-12 
(2000), pointed out that there now is some question as to 
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the continuing validity of the catalyst theory, although it 
indicated that it would be premature to address the issue 
in the context of that case. While I certainly recognize that 
the catalyst theory is followed in this circuit, in view of the 
Court's opinion in Laidlaw, we should not extend it. 
 
In view of the foregoing, while I agree completely with the 
majority that the IEE reimbursement should not be 
allowed, I would reverse the order awarding fees in its 
entirety. 
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